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POLITICAL INTERMEDIARIES
AND THE INTERNET "REVOLUTION"
Elizabeth Garrett*
I. INTRODUCTION
Those who prognosticate about the effect of the Internet on
democratic institutions fall into two groups. Some, like Dick Morris,
proclaim that "[t]he Internet offers a potential for direct democracy
so profound that it may well transform not only our system of poli-
tics but our very form of government."' He identifies several ways
in which our governance system will be revolutionized. First, candi-
dates will need less money to run successful campaigns, so political
parties will wither away.2 Second, citizens will no longer rely on
traditional media sources for political information but will receive
their news in an unmediated way as they roam the Internet.3 Third,
the country will move to a de facto direct democracy as voters par-
ticipate in hundreds of online votes to run the government them-
selves rather than relying on elected representatives.4 Morris is not
the only proponent of this view,5 known as "mobilization" theory
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Democracy Symposium at Loyola Law School; and the research assistance of
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Fund for the Study of Law and Government and the Law and Government
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1. Dick Morris, Direct Democracy and the Internet, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1033, 1033 (2001) [hereinafter Morris, Direct Democracy]; see also DICK
MORRIS, VOTE.COM (1999) (making similar claims) [hereinafter MORRIS,
VOTE.Com].
2. See Morris, Direct Dernocracy, supra note 1, at 1044-46.
3. See id. at 1044.
4. See id. at 1046.
5. Unlike some of the other proponents, however, Morris's personal stake
1055
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW
because it envisions that voters will participate in governance more
frequently and in different ways than they do now.
6
A second group of observers reaches more measured conclu-
sions. This group of "reinforcement" theorists, 7 to which I belong,
agree that new forms of communication and technology will cause
changes in political institutions. However, the Internet will not so
transform our system that it will look radically different in the next
ten, fifteen, or twenty years. Instead, political parties will remain in-
stitutions that shape elections and influence candidates, and voters
will continue to rely on established intermediaries with credible
reputations for their political information. Representative govern-
ment will survive at the federal level while the states will retain gov-
ernance systems that are largely representative with some elements
of direct democracy in states that permit initiatives and referendums.
In the following comment, I briefly expand on these conclusions that
are consistent with reinforcement, not transformation, of established
political patterns.
II. POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE INTERNET
Morris argues that political parties are influential largely be-
cause they funnel money to candidates who desperately need cash to
run increasingly expensive campaigns.8 He maintains that the Inter-
net will substantially reduce the costs of campaigning by reducing
the importance of television advertising.9 Therefore, the importance
of money to candidates will shrink, and, as a result of this change,
in the success of one of the instruments of this revolution, Vote.com, may lead
him to overstate its likelihood and its breadth.
6. See Pippa Norris, Who Surfs? New Technology, Old Voters, and Virtual
Democracy, in DEMOCRACY.COM?: GOVERNANCE IN A NETWORKED WORLD
71, 72 (Elaine Ciulla Kamarck & Joseph S. Nye, Jr. eds., 1999).
7. See id. at 72-73. For one of the best examples of this perspective, see
RICHARD DAVIS, THE WEB OF POLITICS: THE INTERNET'S IMPACT ON THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM (1999) (arguing that the mobilization of public
expression will still largely be the creation of groups and individuals who cur-
rently dominate the political landscape).
8. See Morris, Direct Democracy, supra note 1, at 1044-45; MORRIS,
VOTE.CoM, supra note 1, at 60-61.
9. See MORRIS, VOTE.coM, supra note 1, at 57-58; see also Reed E.
Hundt, The Public's Airwaves: What Does the Public Interest Require of Tele-
vision Broadcasters?, 45 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1100-01 (1996) (providing figures
on campaign media expenses).
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the role of parties will be minimized and perhaps eliminated.' 0 In
contrast, Paul Schwartz explains that he expects campaigns to remain
expensive-even with the growing role of the Interet-because of
the enduring need to advertise on network and cable television sta-
tions, over radio, and through other traditional means of mass com-
munication.' Schwartz's view strikes me as the more realistic one;
if he is correct, then expensive broadcast advertising xvill continue to
be an important part of any campaign. In addition, effective Internet
campaigning will require resources-human and financial-and this
reality will reinforce candidates' needs for money and expertise.
12
Political parties and other established players, like well-known po-
litical consultants who turn their attention to opportunities presented
by the Internet, viii serve these needs and thus continue to exert in-
fluence in the political arena.
Internet lore is replete with stories of candidates like Jesse
Ventura, who with only six hundred dollars set up an Internet web-
site that contributed to his successful campaign for governor.' 3 To
be effective in an increasingly competitive and sophisticated world
of Internet politics, however, a website must catch the attention of
political browsers and keep their attention from wandering to other
websites. Similarly, candidates who plan to inundate potential voters
with e-mail communications must figure out how to convince recipi-
ents to open and read the e-mail rather than deleting it as electronic
junk mail.
Businesses have learned that successful Internet marketing can
be costly. Websites require continuing attention to keep them timely
and interesting to repeat visitors and to take full advantage of the
possibility of interactivity. Candidates are only beginning to learn
10. See MORRIS, VOTE.COM, supra note 1, at 53-61.
11. See Paul M. Schwartz, Vote.con and Internet Politics: A Comment on
Dick Morris's Vision of Internet Democracy, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1071,
1072-77 (2001); see also James Fallows, Internet Illusions, N.Y. REv. BOOKS,
Nov. 16, 2000, at 28 (reviewing DICK MORRIS, VOTE.coM (1999)). Fallows
notes that the Internet sites themselves need to advertise on traditional televi-
sion and radio stations, as well as through print sources, in order to attract at-
tention. See also DAVIS, supra note 7, at 117 (making the same point).
12. See MICHAEL MARGOLIS & DAVID RESNICK, POLITICS AS USUAL: THE
CY1BERSPACE "REVOLUTION" 73-74 (2000).
13. See Dana Milbank, Virtual Politics, NEW REPUBLIC, July 5, 1999, at 22.
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these tricks; most studies conclude that political websites are not
particularly well-designed or effective in grabbing attention." Inter-
net campaigning is less than a decade old, however, and it has really
been an important aspect of campaigning only in the 1998 and 2000
election cycles. Candidates will soon learn that they need expertise
and funding to campaign effectively via the Internet, particularly
challengers who must compete with incumbents who have relatively
sophisticated government-funded official webpages.
More important perhaps than help in Web design and architec-
ture, however, is the need for expertise in targeting the candidate's
substantive message to particular voters. Successful Internet cam-
paigning depends on the campaign's ability to use it to personalize
mass communication by setting up and encouraging one-on-one per-
sonal relationships. This "customized campaign" 15 relies on an array
of software and artificial intelligence programs and the expertise of
political consultants to target personalized messages to voters based
on demographic data available from on-line services. This data is
then augmented as the campaign follows the voter's "cookie" and
develops additional information for more tailored communication.
1 6
For example, John Kasich had different home pages tailored to vot-
ers in Iowa, New Hampshire, and Ohio.17 Candidates can use zip
codes or information gleaned from someone's use of a website pro-
viding weather information to enable them to target geographic
14. See Elaine Ciulla Kamarck, Campaigning on the Internet in the Elec-
tions of 1998, in DEMOCRACY.COM?, supra note 6, at 99, 101; David C. King,
Catching Voters in the Web, in DEMOCRACY.COM?, supra note 6, at 125, 126.
15. Milbank, supra note 13, at 24.
16. See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 1085-86 (discussing ramifications of
this use of somewhat private information and suggesting that it might cause
people to withdraw from the political sphere).
17. This tailoring presents candidates with an opportunity to engage in
cheap talk by providing one message to one group of voters and another, per-
haps inconsistent, message to another group. See David Austen-Smith, Strate-
gic Models of Talk in Political Decision Making, 13 INT'L POL. Sci. REv. 45,
54-55 (1992); McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political
Theory in Statutory Interpretation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1994, at
3. With sophisticated targeting techniques, neither group may become aware
of the differing messages, and it may be difficult for monitoring institutions,
like challengers or the press, to learn of the tactic. The opportunity for cheap
talk in the present system causes voters to discount what candidates say; even
greater discounting may occur in the future.
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location, or candidates can direct particular messages to people based
on which websites they visit regularly. Entrepreneurs like Dick Mor-
ris can sell information about their subscribers to politicians, political
parties, and consultants, as well as offering their services so that the
information is used effectively. The resulting targeting will not be
limited to banner advertising, which Morris believes is not particu-
larly effective, 18 but it will shape the content and architecture of the
webpages themselves.
Certainly, the Internet reduces costs for all candidates who can
set up webpages relatively cheaply and use electronic mail to organ-
ize and inform volunteers. 19 Campaigns have also discovered that e-
mail is a particularly effective means of communicating cheaply and
quickly with the press. 20 Sophisticated use of this new technology,
however, will depend on expertise, and in most cases, candidates vill
not possess such expertise and may not be able to obtain it through
volunteers. Instead, expertise will be purchased from savvy political
operatives, or it will be provided by political parties to ensure the
election of partisans and control of the legislative and executive
branches. It should not surprise us that Dick Morris, a player in the
old world of print and broadcast campaigning, remains a player in
the new world of cyberspace campaigning. The same political con-
sultants and lobbying firms that dominated the old world of influence
peddling continue to dominate the new world of grassroots lobbying
using new technology to communicate and organize.21 These con-
sultants and lobbyists are now turning their attention to candidate and
issue campaigns. Similarly, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Repub-
lican National Committee views the Internet not as a threat or a foe
that will destroy the political party but as an opportunity to reinforce
the influence of parties in elections. During the 2000 elections, he
assigned ten percent of his one hundred fifty staff members at the
18. His conclusion is contested. See, e.g., Tom Hockaday & Martin Ed-
lund, Banner Advertising as a Voter Outreach Tool, CAMPAIGNS &
ELECTIONS, May 1999, at 13-14.
19. See KEVIN A. HELL & JOHN E. HUGHES, CYBERPOLITICS: CITIZEN
ACTVISM IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET 184-86 (1998); Morris, Direct De-
mocracy, supra note 1, at 1044-46.
20. See Chris Mooney, The Virtual Campaign, AM. PROSPECT, Nov. 6,
2000, at 37 (terming the process "e-spin").
21. See DAVIS, supra note 7, at 80.
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national headquarters to focus on Internet campaigning and to pro-
vide Republican candidates with expertise.22 Seventy-three percent
of candidates' websites in the 1998 elections included links to the
website of a political party.23 In short, the established players are
adapting to the new technology and working to become as instru-
mental in an Internet campaign as they are in more traditional poli-
tics. Thus, claims of the demise of political parties and other fixtures
on the political landscape, like consultants, may be premature and in-
accurate.
24
III. THE MEDIA AND THE INTERNET
Morris also predicts that media outlets will find their dominance
destroyed in the new Internet world as millions of websites with po-
litical information and opinions spring up in cyberspace. Certainly,
the Internet provides citizens with a tremendous amount of informa-
tion.2 5 As Bruce Cain convincingly argues in his comment, this sub-
stantial increase in the amount of available information should lead
to the worry that the Internet will overwhelm voters' ability to proc-
ess information. 26 Cain also maintains that much of the news on the
Internet is "garbage," and thus voter competence may actually de-
cline when voters make electoral decisions on the basis of informa-
27tion found in the Drudge Report or even more dubious websites.
The Clinton-Lazio debates may have offered a glimpse of the future
when the candidates were asked for their position on a fictional
22. See Leslie Wayne, On Web, Voters Reinvent Grass-Roots Activism,
N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2000, at A22.
23. See Kamarck, supra note 14, at 117 tbl.10.
24. Some have noted that other advances in communications and other
technology have benefited centralizing entities by increasing their ability to in-
fluence, organize, and control greater numbers of people and larger areas. See,
e.g., Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Information Technology and Democratic Governance,
in DEMOCRACY.COM?, supra note 6, at 1, 9. Transformation theorists answer
that the Internet is different from these other technology "revolutions" and that
its primary effects will be decentralizing ones. At this point, it is hard to de-
termine which is more likely, although both are plausible and the reinforce-
ment theorists have history on their side.
25. See Morris, Direct Democracy, supra note 1, at 1044.
26. See Bruce E. Cain, The Internet in the (Dis)Service of Democracy?, 34
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1005, 1014 (2001).
27. See id. at 1019.
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federal bill that would allegedly tax all e-mail messages with the
equivalent of an electronic postage stamp. 28 Both candidates pro-
claimed their opposition; neither knew that this proposal was an
Internet urban legend spread by several political websites and dis-
cussed in political chat rooms. 29 Interestingly, this Internet rumor
produced so much constituent outcry that the House passed an act
prohibiting the imposition of access charges on Internet service pro-
viders.
30
Although we should worry about the decline in the quality of in-
formation caused by a greater reliance on the Internet, we should also
have some confidence in voters' ability to understand the problem
and to look for ways to ensure that the information that they use to
form their political judgments is credible. Voters will turn to inter-
mediaries with established reputations that can be trusted to deliver
verified and accurate information. Not surprisingly, voters who cur-
rently get some of their political information from Internet sources
rely largely on the websites of established news sources like CNN,
the network television companies, the New York Times, the Wash-
ington Post, and other well-known newspapers. 31 Even websites de-
signed for political junkies, such as Morris's former competitor
Voter.com, hire reporters and analysts with established reputations
like Carl Bernstein, Tucker Carlson, and other syndicated columnists
whose names are familiar from the more traditional media sources.
32
28. See David Emery, Email Tax Hoax Fouls N.Y. Senate Debate,
URBANLEGENDS.COM, at http:llurbanlegends.about.comscience/urbanlegends
library/blnydebate.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2001).
29. See id.
30. See H.R. 1291, 106th Cong. (2d Sess. 2000) (enacted); see also Robert
MacMillan, Lmvmakers Discuss Downside of Net Accessibility, NEWSBYTE5
NEws NETWORK, May 11, 1999, at http//,wv.newsbytes.com/newsI99/
130458.html (discussing a rumor that Congress was ready to pass a bill sub-
jecting Internet access calls to per-minute charges).
31. See DAVIS, supra note 7, at 45-48; Norris, supra note 6, at 83-85 &
tbl.5.
32. See Voter.com, at http'J/www.voter.com/home/news/columnists
0,1171,2-,00.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2001), for a list of Voter.com's
columnists, all of whom are well-known from traditional media. Twenty per-
cent of Voter.comn was owned by Patton Boggs, one of Washington's leading
lobbying law firms. See Kate Ackley, Taking Root on the Web, INFLUENCE
ONLINE at http:wvww.influenceonline.nettdatalnews20000905160641.htm
(Sept. 6, 2000). Voter.com shut down in February 2001, because it was not
A pril 200 1] 1061
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Again, the reinforcement theorists appear to have the better ar-
gument with respect to the effect of the Internet on the mass media-
not only in describing the current state of affairs but also in predict-
ing that it will continue in much the same fashion. Voters need me-
diating institutions in order to gather trustworthy information without
spending the time themselves to verify accuracy. It does not surprise
me that although Morris describes the Internet as providing citizens
access to a horizontal panoply of information, all the providers he
lists are the websites of well-established media outlets like the New
York Times, the San Francisco Examiner, and the Manchester Un-
ion-Leader.33  This hardly erodes the "bases of journalistic baro-
nies," 34 rather, it extends their influence to people who cannot easily
receive the print version in a timely fashion.
In his enthusiasm, Morris overlooks a possible serious negative
effect of an increasing reliance on the Internet to obtain information
even when most of the news is provided by credible sites with repu-
tations for accuracy. Bruce Cain describes this effect as "segmenta-
tion";35 it is sometimes called "balkanization" in the Internet litera-
ture.36  The Internet has a different structure of providing
information, and that structure appears to impose a sort of tunnel vi-
sion on many users. They receive information only through custom-
designed home pages and e-mail alerts, and they only visit chat
rooms and issue-oriented webpages constructed by people who share
their perspectives and opinions.37  Users of news websites often
profitable despite the support of political parties and the established media and
political players. See Ross Kerber, Voter.com Pulls the Plug, BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 6, 2001, at D1.
33. See Morris, Direct Democracy, supra note 1, at 1044.
34. Id.
35. See Cain, supra note 26, at 1018; see also Lawrence Lessig, The Con-
stitution of Code: Limitations on Choice-Based Critiques of Cyberspace
Regulation, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 181, 189 (1997) (discussing how com-
puter programs automatically screen information for the user and analyzing
whether the government should be allowed to utilize this screening power);
Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110
YALE L.J. 71, 100-02 (2000) (discussing how the ability to filter information
on the Internet leads to fragmentation).
36. See Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L.
REv. 499, 519 (2000).
37. See William A. Galston, (How) Does Internet Affect Community? Some
Speculations in Search of Evidence, in DEMOCRACY.COM?, supra note 6,
1062 [34:1055
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construct filters so that they receive articles and e-mails only on top-
ics that they have selected previously. They may receive more in-
depth information about these topics than they could before the rise
of the Internet, but they do not tend to browse through the cyber-
space news sources and happen on to a story that they unexpectedly
find engaging. Furthermore, politically active Internet users partici-
pate in chat rooms that tend to reinforce, rather than challenge, their
beliefs and opinions. Users segment into communities of like-
minded people with the result that they are not exposed to a diversity
of views. They do not have to confront convincing arguments on the
other side of an issue and defend their own positions.
Thus, at the same time the Internet makes more information
easily available to users, its structure tends to reduce the breadth of
information that users encounter. This effect of the structure of cy-
berspace may lead to a decline in the richness of political discourse
and a narrowing of the perspective of our citizens.38 This is not a
necessary result of increased use of the Internet to obtain political
news. Perhaps people will work to break free of segmentation and
seek out balanced or competing presentations of news, probably from
established sources with good reputations because that method of
combating segmentation reduces search costs.39 In part, this is an
empirical question, and early studies suggest that the fear of seg-
mentation is real.
IV. DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE INTERNET
Morris's most revolutionary claim is that the Internet ushers in
direct democracy for the United States.40 Again, Morris insists that
at 45; Dennis Thompson, James Madison on Cyberdenocrac,, in
DEMOCRACY.COM?, supra note 6, at 35.
38. See Cass R. Sunstein, Republic.con 8-10 (2001) (discussing the nega-
tive effects of segmentation on political system); see also id. at 65-69, 75-77
(reviewing evidence that deliberation among like-minded people may only in-
tensify previously held views and teming this "enclave deliberation").
39. The Federal Communication Commission's fairness doctrine was aban-
doned in part because of the assumption that in a balanced marketplace of
ideas, consumers will seek out diverse perspectives. See In the Matter of In-
quiry into Section 73.1910 of the Comm'n Rules and Regulations Concerning
Alternatives to the Gen. Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broad. Licensees, 3
F.C.C.R. 2050, 2051 (1988).
40. See Morris, Direct Democracy, supra note 1, at 1033.
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the Internet leads to unmediated interactions between voters and the
very institutions of governance.41 Once again, he overstates his case
because he does not acknowledge that intermediaries will remain vi-
tally important in his new world, although intermediaries will have to
adapt to the new technology and new mediating institutions may
arise.42 His claim has at least two parts: First, voters will e-mail
their representatives more frequently and thus affect policy by this
kind of mass personalized communication. Second, voters will en-
gage in nationwide referendums, held by commercial websites like
Morris's Vote.com, and these polls will have such force that elected
officials will follow the poll results or they will be thrown out of of-
fice in the next election. Both claims are unconvincing.
First, the mass e-mails, which websites like Vote.com facilitate
and well-paid experts in grassroots lobbying coordinate into an ap-
parent wave of popular discontent, are not substantially different
from the mass mailing campaigns of the past decades. 43 Representa-
tives often get thousands of postcards or form letters from constitu-
ents on a salient issue pending before Congress. Those missives are
counted and the tallies are reported to the representatives; constitu-
ents receive a form letter-usually signed by an autopen or intern-
as a response. These direct mail campaigns have an effect because
41. See id. at 1046.
42. Eugene Volokh and Jerry Kang presented the most exciting new form
of intermediation when they predicted that affinity groups as well as political
parties would provide voters with software programs that would either list en-
dorsed candidates in a window that could be opened alongside the electronic
ballot, or that might even be able to "vote" for the citizen, who would then
merely "send" the ballot to the state. See Jerry Kang, E-Racing E-Lections, 34
LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1155, 1168 (2001); Eugene Volokh, How Might Cyber-
space Change American Politics?, 34 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1213, 1214-16
(2001). This kind of informational shortcut would improve voter competence
considerably, as would the possibility that ballots themselves would provide
additional information about candidates and issues. See Bill Jones, CAL.
INTERNET VOTING TASK FORCE, A REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY OF INTERNET
VOTING: JANUARY 2000; see also Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and Economics
of "Informed Voter" Ballot Notations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1533, 1581-86 (1999)
(explaining the need for voting shortcuts and suggesting ways to provide in-
formation on the ballot that would improve voter competence).
43. This was a concern mentioned in the legislative history of the Federal
Regulation of Lobbying Act, passed in 1946, and has remained a focus of lob-
bying reform and scholarship on interest group activity at the federal level.
See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 620-21 n.10 (1954).
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they provide information to the representative about the views of
constituents. But they are also discounted because they are often
"artificial" in the sense that the sender would not have cared enough
to contact her representative in the absence of a prod and would not
have incurred much cost to do so even after being prodded."
Mass e-mails are treated the same way. They seldom reach the
representative directly-unless the sender is a constituent with politi-
cal clout-but instead go into some legislative correspondent's in-
box and receive an automatic or form response. Representatives
learn of the e-mail campaign and get a tally of the votes for and
against, and this information is relevant to policy decisions although
it does not dictate them. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that the
volume of substantive, individually written communications by con-
stituents to representatives has increased because of the relative ease
of e-mail.45 Such individuated communications are typically given
more weight by lawmakers. This phenomenon, which is likely to
continue given the lower cost of e-mail communication, may change
the policy agenda somewhat and require legislators to respond with
clearer positions on controversial issues.
Morris claims that online referendums will change our system of
governance into a de facto direct democracy, where representatives
are mere conduits, implementing the result of popular votes. Pre-
sumably, as was the case with direct election of senators,46 ultimately
the de facto regime will be institutionalized as the de jure one, pre-
sumably through a constitutional amendment. This claim misappre-
hends the reasons why we do not now have-and are not likely to
develop-a direct democracy at the federal level. It is only partly
because of the inconvenience of driving to polling places and stand-
ing in line to cast our ballots, costs that are eliminated by Internet
44. See KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNAY, ORGANIZED
INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 194 (1986) (noting that letter writing
campaigns are the "least effective and most relied-on lobbying technique").
45. See e-mail from Jamil Jaffer to Elizabeth Garrett (Nov. 6, 2000,
19:14:46 CST) (on file with author) (discussing change in constituent commu-
nications in the House of Representatives from January 1999 to September
2000).
46. See Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Stnrc-
tural Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1347,
1352-55 (1996).
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voting opportunities, at least for those who have access to computers
at home or at work.47 It is mainly because the vast majority of citi-
zens do not want to spend time finding information about all the de-
cisions necessary to run a country, analyzing that information, and
developing opinions about the right policy. Just as our representa-
tives rationally delegate tasks to expert staff and committees, citizens
rationally delegate to representatives most of the tasks required to
run government.48 Time and attention are limited, and most people
vastly prefer to spend their time making money, enjoying activities
with family and friends, and relaxing in leisure pursuits than assess-
ing and then voting on twenty to thirty issues per night. Voters in
states with numerous ballot measures in each election complain
about the time required to cast competent votes once every year or
so; for example, voters in Oregon this fall received a 376-page in-
formation booklet with data about the twenty-six measures on the
ballot in 2000.4 9 Imagine their outrage if they were asked to read
such a booklet every evening after dinner so that they could run the
government directly through online plebiscites.
50
Realistically, most citizens will never participate in online refer-
endums. The few who are willing to spend some of their limited
time in that way will do so infrequently and only to answer policy
questions posed at a very high level of generality.5 1 Thus, represen-
tatives will still be required, and they will continue to have a great
deal of influence because of their control over the details and
47. See R. Michael Alvarez & Jonathan Nagler, The Likely Consequences
of Internet Voting for Political Representation, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1115,
1129-31 tbls.2-3 (2001) (discussing preliminary empirical findings about dif-
ferences in groups' access to the Internet).
48. See generally D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBiNS, THE
LOGIC OF DELEGATION: CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS
PROCESS (1991) (explaining why delegation is often efficient and rational).
49. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Oregon Ballot Full of Voter Initiatives Be-
comes Issue Itself in Oregon, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2000, at A24.
50. See DAVIS, supra note 7, at xiv, 23, 180.
51. Paul Schwartz's argument that the entity framing the referendum ques-
tion will have extraordinary influence on the outcome is not only correct but is
a powerful reason why results of polls such as those run by Morris's website
should be viewed with a great deal of skepticism. See Schwartz, supra note
11, at 1082; see also Garrett, supra note 42, at 1552-53 (1999) (discussing im-
portance of framing in electoral outcomes).
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implementation of policies determined by popular vote on issues
framed in very broad terms. Once we understand that this more lim-
ited vision of "direct democracy" is the only one likely, even with
the rise of the Internet as a means of political communication, the vi-
sion of the future is not radically different-if at all different-from
the current system. Polls and focus groups are now influential fac-
tors in a representative's decision-making process.52 Currently, rep-
resentatives seek to determine popular opinion with regard to any is-
sue that could potentially prompt tens of millions of citizens to vote
in an online referendum-a condition that Morris admits is necessary
for poll results to have sufficient force to dictate the actions of repre-
sentatives. If they believe that voters will rely on the issue when
they vote in candidate elections, popular opinion will be a significant
factor in current decision making. If the issue is salient enough that
it could prompt large citizen turnout in an online referendum, it is
salient enough now for the media, challengers, or other policy entre-
preneurs to highlight at election time and for voters to use in decid-
ing whether to reelect the incumbent. In other words, it is hard to
discern how the possibility of online referendums that do not suffer
from the current weaknesses of Morris's polls on Vote.com, e.g., a
small, skewed sample of citizens who might vote more than one time
in each poll, transforms the current system in which representatives
already pay close attention to popular sentiment.
Others at this Symposium have suggested that Internet technol-
ogy may improve the accuracy of opinion polls, which are hampered
now by citizens who use caller identification systems and answering
machines to filter phone calls and avoid participating in polls.
53
Even under current conditions, some commentators have worried
that the ubiquity and influence of opinion polls have undermined the
independence of representatives and decreased the quality of their
52. See, e.g., LAWRENCE K. GROSSMAN, THE ELECTRONIC REPUBLIC:
RESHAPING DEMOCRACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 58-63 (1995) (discussing
the inordinate influence of polls currently and arguing that the system of repre-
sentative democracy has been undermined); see also John F. Harris, Presi-
dency by Poll, WASH. POST NAT'L WKLY. EDITION, Jan. 8, 2000, at 9 (de-
scribing extraordinary reliance on polls that characterized policymaking in the
Clinton White House).
53. In much the same fashion, filtering technology may undermine poll-
sters' attempts to obtain representative samples via the Internet.
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deliberation. If the polls are seen as more accurate because of im-
provements in technology, perhaps representatives will be tempted to
turn to them more and increasingly abdicate their responsibilities to
interact with constituents and participate in the process of preference
formation. On the other hand, if the polls that develop through Inter-
net technology are modeled along the lines of Fishkin's deliberative
polls,54 perhaps they will become a vital part of deliberative repre-
sentative democracy. But the availability of opinion polls has not,
and will not, change our institutions of governance so that the coun-
try is run though a perpetual town meeting in cyberspace.
Indeed, depending on how we use the new technology, it might
improve the quality of representative government. For example,
Internet voting provides new possibilities in designing the content of
the ballot so that better information is provided to voters about can-
didates and issues. If voters could click on a name or ballot initiative
and receive more information, perhaps through a statement by the
candidates or by groups on either side of a ballot question, voter
competence might improve. Or if they could obtain access while
voting to electronic versions of slate mailing cards, citizens could be
more certain that their votes reflected their preferences. In short, as
Bruce Cain argues, the Internet does not necessarily favor one ver-
sion of democracy over another, and it could be used to foster a
move in the direction described by populist democrats or by civic re-
publicans. 55 What it cannot do is establish direct democracy because
it can neither expand the hours in a day nor convince voters to spend
additional hours on politics rather than on other more rewarding pur-
suits.
V. CONCLUSION
My objective in this comment has been to bring a more realistic
perspective to the exaggerated claims of Dick Morris and other
54. See JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION
AND DEMOCRACY 161-76 (1995); James S. Fishkin & Robert C. Luskin,
Bringing Deliberation to the Democratic Dialogue, in THE POLL WITH A
HUMAN FACE: THE NATIONAL ISSUES CONVENTION EXPERIMENT IN
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 3-38 (Maxwell McCombs & Amy Reynolds eds.,
1999); see also Sunstein, supra note 38, at 84-87 (discussing the relationship
between the Internet and Fishkin's work).
55. See Cain, supra note 26, at 1012.
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mobilization-or transformation-theorists. My objective has not
been to deny that the Internet will have some potentially far-reaching
effects on the political system. That claim is as unrealistically mod-
est as Morris's vision is radically extreme. Internet voting may af-
fect turnout, especially of younger voters, and it offers new possi-
bilities to provide all voters with shortcuts to improve their
competence at election time. The Internet will expand access to in-
formation, provided by both purveyors of inaccurate rumors and ur-
ban legends on the one hand and by credible news sources on the
other hand, and it will engage some interested citizens in new forms
of political interactions. It may change our notions of "community"
and "interest group" which in turn may change the way that we vote
and participate in politics. 5 6 It provides new challenges to campaign
finance laws,5 7 and it presents new opportunities for expanded and
more effective disclosure of campaign contributions and expendi-
tures.5 8 These effects deserve close attention and they will demand
that existing political systems adapt to the new technology, much as
they have adapted to other "revolutions" in the political world.
56. See, for example, Eben Moglen & Pamela S. Karlan, The Soul of a New
Political Machine: The Online, The Color Line and Electronic Democracy, 34
LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1089, 1098 (2001) and the comments following.
57. See Ryan P. Winder, Preserving the Potential for Politics Online: The
Internet's Challenge to Federal Election Law, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1867, 1882
(2000).
58. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 408 (2000)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy stated:
Among the facts the Court declines to take into account is the emer-
gence of cyberspace communication by which political contributions
can be reported almost simultaneously with payment .... This is a far
more immediate way to assess the integrity and the performance of
our leaders than through the hidden world of soft money and covert
speech.
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